An academic paper submitted in May 2010 footnotes removed
Introduction
Virtual worlds, the fruits of technological innovation, offer the potential for enormous creativity and human good. Yet recently in the media there has been many examples of the negative impacts of such technology on human behaviour. The purpose of this study is to examine the ethical challenge of virtual worlds to the Christian community. I want to examine whether such worlds should be embraced or avoided, and if they are to be embraced how should a disciple of Christ conduct themselves within these environments? To confine the scope of this study, I shall focus on the individual inhabiting virtual reality as a leisure pursuit rather than for more constructive purposes and with reference to one of the more established online technology platforms, Second Life. I will first discuss some initial concerns about a Christian approach to ethics in a postmodern milieu, something that in itself presents an enormous challenge. Second, I record some of my personal experiences using Second Life. Finally, I take the concerns of theological ethics informed by the opening discussion and look at the implications for the individual.
Christian Theology, Ethics and Postmodernity
Before turning to Second Life, I must first briefly explore some presuppositions that might inform a Christian approach to ethics in a virtual world. There are two dangers with this type of study: one, that we fail to take account the distinctiveness of Christian theology; the second, that we arbitrarily posit a monolithic ethical framework to which the subject must conform without acknowledging the postmodern context in which the subject and object of this study is immersed. For a genuine theological approach to ethics one might choose, for example, to follow Karl Barth who writes that, ‘the goodness of human conduct’ is found in the ‘event of an act of God himself... namely his speech and self-revelation’. He sees this ‘act of God’, which models qua empowers humanity to live ethically, as the interrelated deed of creation, reconciliation and redemption. For Barth ethics is deontological; it is about an obedient response to the ‘commands of God’, but it also cannot be separated from a teleology based on the salvific ‘divine claiming’ of Jesus Christ, and the christological virtues faith, love and hope. However Stanley Grenz, who posits an ethic of ‘comprehensive love’ built on a similar salvation-history motif, notes that an ethic that derives from theology is only ever appropriate for the community whose identity is built on faith and finds existential meaning in the narrative of the Christian Scriptures. Here, Grenz begins to highlight a problem for theological ethics, not for a Christian person among a community of believers per se, but as that Christian moves out from familiar surroundings into the world (or worlds). One might posit a theological approach to ethics with morality fixed in the infinite life of the Triune God and communicated through divine revelation, but there is the antithetical problem of a world full of free diverse moral agents. With this in mind, I turn to the postmodern condition.
Postmodernity could be considered as an intellectual and cultural reaction to the political and economic events of the twentieth century. This movement, facilitated also by rapid advances in science and technology, has contributed towards an increasingly critical stance towards the notion of ‘progress’ as the ultimate universal human aim. The naïveté of the modern intellectual project has been exposed, and the reference point for discerning a coherent purpose and indeed the reality of human existence is missing. In postmodernity there is no absolute truth or metanarrative to provide an answer to existential questions, just interweaving discourses or texts open to a plethora of different interpretations. This presents a problem for a theological approach to ethics. R. Scott Smith observes that despite trying to work within ‘linguistic constructionism’, the idea that knowledge is determined by language, contemporary Christian approaches to ethics still presuppose ‘epistemic access to an unconstructed ‘extra-linguistic’ realm’ to understand virtues or the moral ‘self’ as real objects. Thus, the challenge to theological ethics, is how to work within the ‘epistemological crisis’ caused by a linguistic turn in postmodern philosophy and hold onto another way of knowing and of being. In view of this uncertainty, Graham Houston suggests that an ‘Ethic of Christian Realism’ is needed to explore the ethics of virtual worlds. Either way, ethics in postmodernity is about negotiating different horizons to discern the moral interpretations of the texts that lie before us. Whether we follow Houston or other theological approaches, we must avoid the problematic power dynamic of asserting ‘the’ Christian moral interpretation over another.
One could also argue that the discourse of modern theology including the ideas cited above fail to recognize the pervasive impact of technology. Yet there has also been a ‘technological turn’ in postmodernity; a shift from technology as a tool for stewardship to the means through which human existence is mediated. This is especially true in communications technology epitomized by the development of virtual worlds, such as Second Life. The power of internet software and ubiquitous computing enables people to inhabit virtually the texts, discourses and narratives they construct. On this note, I turn to my example.
Second Life: A Case Study
Second Life is a computer generated three-dimensional virtual world created by the company Linden Lab in 2003. It is presented by its founders as a “a place to connect, a place to shop, a place to work, a place to love, a place to explore, a place to be...”. This introduction advertises a range of human existential possibilities, and by using the language of ‘place’ it invites a blurring of the boundary between the real and the virtual. My initial impression was that it felt like a game. David Buckingham outlines a number of features that define ‘gameness’, and Second Life conforms to these. There are rules for play contained in the Terms of Service, and limitations designed into the software. To a lesser extent there are ‘outcomes’, though these are not fixed in the same way as traditional role playing games. In Second Life an objective might be to socialize, spend money, or establish a business. Users have to invest real time in achieving desired outcomes, and there is a certain amount of emotional attachment to these ends. Jesper Juul also notes that ‘games have negotiable consequences for real life’. Consequences attached to users actions in Second Life, however, go beyond that of role playing games.
On Second Life, the user begins by creating a computer generated representation of themselves - an ‘avatar’. According to Andrew Burn, this Sanskrit word originally referred ‘to the embodiment of a god on earth’. Whilst the context of the word has changed, it is interesting that Second Life offers the possibility of becoming a virtual god or goddess. Elaine Graham describes this phenomenon with reference to the thought of Jean Baudrillard, as a ‘hyper-real’ representation of the self. Virtual worlds give people the opportunity to presents themselves in ways that transcend their real selves and to become something different, a ‘hyper-real’ or post-human self. Unlike social networking websites which encourage a certain amount of representational verisimilitude - Second Life stretches the distance between the real and the virtual in aesthetic terms. Most of the avatars I encountered either fitted stereotypes of physical perfection or deliberately subverted them. This begs the question as to whether the software platform also stretches the distance between the real and virtual in terms of ethics. The fact that Second Life is not a game but a platform for ‘real’ or ‘hyper-real’ human activity, betrayed by the use of the first-person to describe my experiences, means that Burn’s observation about different levels of engagement does not apply in the same way. It is always the user in Second Life who, by extension, is engaging with other avatars, artefacts or the environment. The user has complete freedom within the confines of the software and the Terms of Service (although I am not sure how the latter is enforced) to behave as they wish. I can represent myself however I want and communicate using animated gestures, text, or my own voice. There is power to create new narratives either individually or socially. Interaction with the environment is more restricted - I cannot walk through walls, for example, but I can sit on top of high buildings or drink a virtual latté in outer space. Any virtual object can be purchased or created provided enough Linden Dollars have been uploaded onto your user account. I found the creative and social power offered by Second Life to be potentially dangerous as well as helpful and good. There are opportunities for building friendship but also the potential for abuse. Although mediated through a digital environment, the conversations I had were real. The hope of acceptance and fear of rejection I experienced when socializing generated the same emotional response as if the interactions had happened in real life. I could be ‘friendly’ and generous to other people or ignore them.
The ambiguous distance between the real self and the virtual or ‘hyper-real’ self adds a layer of ambiguity to human social and economic relationships in Second Life. Representation or ‘virtual presence’ could be considered a manifestation, of what Alistair Mcfadyen calls, a ‘lower-level’ or surface self that has been adapted in accordance with the given social environment in contrast to the ‘deep’ or true self. A virtual existence in one textual horizon, such as Second Life, fails to account of other expressions of that same person in other horizons. Behind each avatar is a real person who may also be active on other technology platforms. It is virtually impossible to access that real person, unless you know them from elsewhere. There are therefore significant ethical implications to the way that social power is handled in virtual worlds.
Christian Ethics and Virtual Worlds
So, to what extent is it appropriate for Christians to engage with virtual worlds like Second Life? To begin with, we must note from the discussion on theology, ethics and postmodernity that there is a valid place for a Christian presence in a virtual world. Christian theology gives rise to the idea that God’s mission is about redemptive engagement within the horizons of human activity. I have shown, particularly with reference to Barth, that the call to live ethically is grounded in the life and expression of the Triune God. God’s salvific act shapes deontological, teleological and virtue approaches to ethics. Faith enables epistemic access to this ‘extra-linguistic’ source that helps determine moral objects and virtues in creation. This is the unique premise for theological approaches to ethics, but this starting place shifts to linguistic horizons, when the Christian individual enters the domain of image and language such as that facilitated by virtual technologies. Postmodernity allows for the presence of Christian ethical thought in a virtual world as a discourse or body of language that offers a vital way of making sense out of human existence. If one follows Houston’s thesis of an ‘Ethic of Christian Realism’ within postmodernity, the principal way for moral objects and virtues to become tangible in a virtual worlds such as Second Life is through the presence of Christians. For Christians, representing themselves as an avatar, this will mean imitating a rather different kind of ‘god’. But, as also noted in relation to the question of personhood, Second Life itself is only one existential horizon among many. A more rounded view of social ethics in relation to virtual technologies might only be discerned with reference to human behaviour in other horizons. For now it is enough to conclude that Christians should embrace virtual worlds, at least in part.
How then should Christians conduct themselves ethically within the virtual world? First, the disciple of Christ should be mindful of the creative and social power offered by virtual technologies and handle such power sensitively. In the discussion about Second Life I have shown there to be a link, although tenuous and often blurred, between the seemingly real and virtual. With the freedom to represent oneself however one wishes and to behave in any way possible, the Christian is responsible for representing a realist image of themselves. This will involve bringing to the surface the ‘deep’ self formed before God through the history of human communication that constitutes their being and not to represent themselves through a ‘lower-level’ fictitious character perhaps with idiosyncratic behaviour. A Christian’s avatar should reflect as much as possible the person behind it. Users of Second Life should be reminded, by good example, that behind each avatar is a real person and inappropriate behaviour, whilst it might be indirect, can have real consequences.
Secondly, in worlds constructed by digital images, text and language, Christians have a responsibility to close the gap between the plethora of interpretations that arise from virtual social interactions and the real intended meaning behind the text; in linguistic terms, to reduce the ambiguity between the signified and the signifier. Maybe it is at the boundary of diverse discourses, in the silent punctuation between text and reader, or reader and text, where an ‘extra-linguistic’ Christian ethic can come into play. Or perhaps the Christian faith, with its altogether different epistemic vantage point, offers a plain straightforward alternative. Faced with the scrolling ‘chat’ coming from multiple directions in Second Life, there is an opportunity to engage critically with immoral language and to redeem it through reinterpretation. There is the opportunity to convey human good in the epinarrative of each social encounter in a way that honours Christ and avoids the postmodern problem of asserting one interpretation over another. I can question other users about the way they choose to represent themselves or communicate. Behaviour that is rude and abusive can be contradicted and challenged. Christians can also help new-comers adjust to the unfamiliar social conventions of a virtual world. Alongside the duty to behave in a way that accords with the good revealed in Jesus Christ, the virtues of generosity, transparency, clarity of meaning, integrity and trustworthiness are important gifts that Christians offer by engaging with a virtual community.
Conclusion
I have explored how virtual technologies offer new existential horizons for human activity; new worlds where human beings can engage with one another. Theology compels Christians to engage critically with virtual worlds and its inhabitants. A Christian approach to social ethics in such an environment is shaped by theology as a meaning making discourse among other competing discourses. The ethos that lies behind the postmodern condition also presupposes sensitive engagement. There is therefore a place for the disciple of Christ to write themselves into the existential horizon of a virtual world and for theological ethics to be applied in the midst of social texts. However this should not be done without loosing sight of other worlds which enhance the meaning of the self such as the Christian community. The disciple of Christ needs to be aware of the creative and social power of virtual worlds, and the risks and opportunities associated with them. Christians have a responsibility to make plain, as far as is possible, what is hidden. To remind people that there is a real person behind each avatar and that virtual behaviour has real consequences. This can be achieved by representing themselves accurately, communicating in a way that removes the ambiguity between the real and the virtual, and redeeming and reinterpreting harmful or immoral language. In this way Christian ethics can become real and readable in a virtual world.
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Bibliography
Barth, Karl, Ethics, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1981.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics I/1, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936.
Carr, Diane, et al., Computer Games: Text, Narrative and Play, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.
Graham, Elaine L., Representations of the post/human: monsters, aliens and others in popular culture. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002.
Grenz, Stanley J., The Moral Quest: foundations of Christian ethics, Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997.
Houston, Graham R., Virtual Morality: Christian ethics in a computer age. Leicester: Apollos, 1999.
Lyon, David, Postmodernity, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994.
Mcfadyen, Alistair I., The Call to Personhood: a Christian theory of the individual in social relationships. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990.
Pattison, George, Thinking about God in an age of technology. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Smith, R. Scott, Virtue ethics and moral knowledge: philosophy of language after MacIntyre and Hauerwaus, Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2003.
Vanhoozer, Kevin J. (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to postmodern theology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Websites
Second Life Home http://secondlife.com/whatis/
Second Life Terms of Service http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php
Virtual World Theology Blog http://virtualworldtheology.blogspot.com
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